Tuesday, September 17, 2013

The USGA’s War on Sandbagging – Part II, Shock and Awe


 (The United States Golf Association (USGA) has made various attempts to control players who manipulate their handicaps in order to do well in tournaments.  The name for such manipulation is “sandbagging.” If the USGA’s effort can be characterized as a war, then it is not winning.  A series of six posts examines the history and effectiveness of the USGA’s war plan.  Part I details the flaws of the USGA’s earliest attempt at controlling sandbagging.  Part II examines a proposed policy that increased the penalties for alleged sandbagging. Part III argues the current handicap system may actually encourage sandbagging.  Part IV explains why the USGA could be losing the effort to win the hearts and minds of local golfers.  Part V  examines the flaws in the USGA's current war strategy.  Part VI asks if the USGA's efforts are counterproductive and suggests it may be time for the USGA to withdraw from the battlefield.)


            Back in the late 1990’s, the USGA recognized the War on Sandbagggers was not going well.  At the same time there was a national movement to get tough on crime.  Several states adopted a “Three Strikes Law” where conviction on a third crime put the defendant away for life.  This draconian belief struck a chord at the USGA. It was time to hit sandbagger’s with “shock and awe.”  If a Three Strikes Law could keep criminals off the streets, a similar harsh penalty for exceptional tournament performance could keep sandbaggers off the courses.

            Under Sec. 10-3, a player had his indexed reduced if he had two exceptional tournament scores.  It was believed that a player with three exceptional scores was definitely a sandbagger and had to be hit with a severe penalty.  And thus was born a handicapping procedure termed Three Strikes and You’re Out (TSYO).

             Unfortunately, the USGA did not design a coherent and equitable handicap procedure.  The resulting TSYO did not advance the war effort. To be fair, TSYO was only tested in several major golf associations.  Nevertheless, many golfers were treated unfairly under the test procedure.  TSYO did, however, demonstrate the cavalier methods employed by the USGA in formulating handicap policy and why its efforts would have  little or no effect on sandbagging.

            TSYO is too complex for the average golfer to comprehend.  Because it is so arcane its description has been relegated to the Appendix.  While it is bad policy to govern by laws that cannot be understood, this may have been the USGA’s objective.  Complexity may be thought of as the equivalent of intelligence.  If golfers do not understand the system, they may mistakenly believe it was put together by really smart people – or at least smarter than they are – and would be less likely to question the procedure.  In essence, the USGA gains omnipotence and a reduction in flack by burdening the golf community with unnecessarily complex handicapping procedures. 

A listing of the fatal and obvious flaws of TYSO demonstrates the authors at the USGA were not really smart people.

Case 1 - HIGHER THIRD EXCEPTIONAL ROUND LEADS TO LOWER REDUCED INDEX

            The stated aim of the TSYO procedure is to penalize a player who has an exceptional third round.  TSYO, however, does not always meet that objective.  Take for example two players who both have a computed index of 15.0.  They have three tournament rounds as shown in the Table1 below:
Table 1

How the Third Round Affects the Reduction in Handicap 

Player
T-Score Differentials
Subject to 3-Strikes?
Reduced
Index
Player A
5.0
5.0
12.0
Yes
7.3
Player B
5.0
5.0
30.0
No
6.0


Player A has a much better third tournament than Player B, yet his reduced index is higher.  So you have the unintended consequence of a higher score leading to lower index (i.e., a harsher penalty)..  TSYO does not meet its objective in consistently penalizing exceptional third tournament performance.

Case 2 - PLAYER AVOIDS TSYO PENALTY BY PLAYING POORLY

By playing poorly, a player can eliminate the TSYO penalty.  Assume, for example, a player with a 31.5 index and 13 tournament rounds who has the T-Scores shown in the Table 2 below:

Table 2

How the Computed Index Affects TSYO Penalty 

Index
T-Score Differentials
Subject to 3-Strikes?
Reduced Index
31.5
23.6
24.1
24.5
Y
24.1
34.3
23.6
24.1
24.5
N
26.3


This player’s reduced index would be 24.1 under the TSYO.  If the player increases his computed index to 34.3 or higher, however, he is no longer subject to TSYO.  His index is then only reduced to 26.3. 

            This is a case where more exceptional (i.e., it is more exceptional for a 34.3 index player to have these T-scores than for a 31.5 index player) performance is penalized less.  This is contrary to what TSYO was supposed to achieve.

Case 3 - PLAYER GETS TSYO PENALTY MERELY FOR ENTERING A TOURNAMENT

            Assume the player with the 31.5 index in the example above had only played in three tournaments.  The player would not be subject to the TSYO, and his reduced index would be 25.8.  If he enters another tournament, however, and plays poorly his TSYO reduced index would drop to 24.1.  This reduction is contrary to the spirit of the adjustment.  The reduction in index for exceptional performance should not increase with the number of tournaments played.

Case 4 - PENALTY DOES NOT FIT THE CRIME

Another example fully illustrates the inequity of the TSYO procedure.  Assume you have four player’s with indexes of 12,11,10, and 9.  They all have three tournament rounds of with T-Score differentials of 5.0.  Table 3 presents the indexes using the TSYO procedure.
Table 3

Reduced Handicaps for Identical Performance 

Index
TSYO Index
Penalty
12
7.0
5.0
11
7.5
3.5
10
5.0
5.0
9
9.0
0.0


            Even though the player with the 10 index just barely qualifies for a TSYO (the 9 index gets no reduction), he receives the lowest reduced index of all the players.  The player with the 11 index receives a lesser punishment even though his performance was more exceptional. 

Case 5 - PLAYER DOES NOT PLAY TO HIS INDEX, BUT STILL RECEIVES THREE STRIKES PENALTY

Assume a player with six tournament scores has the following index and T-Scores in his files at the start of Month1:

Month
Index
T-Score Differentials
Reduced Index
Month 1
17
6.0
8.0
15.0
8.6
Month 2
16
6.0
8.0
10.0
8.0

In Month 1, the player enters a tournament and has a differential of 10.0.  This differential is 1.4 strokes above his index for the tournament.  Even though he did not play to his index, the player comes under TSYO and his reduced index is dropped to 8.0 in Month 2.  This is cruel and unusual punishment.

            Exceptional performance should be defined in terms of the T-score differential and the index the player is actually assigned.  To base a TSYO penalty on an index that is not used in a tournament (i.e., the computed index), will give many players an “exceptional performance” penalty for play that is truly unexceptional.  (Note: In Month 2, it has been assumed that the player’s computed index dropped to 16.0.  He would still get the same TSYO penalty, however, even if his computed index remained at 17.0.)


            Faced with overwhelming evidence that TSYO had many fatal flaws, you might expect the USGA and the SCGA to be apologetic.  After all, they inflicted this curious system on much of the golf community without even a cursory analysis of its impact.  If one expected an expression of regret from these two golf organizations, however, one was to be disappointed.

   Dean Knuth, Senior Director of Handicapping for the USGA wrote:

”You also point out some of the concerns about consistency in the application of the test procedure that had already come to our attention…Generally, golf associations testing the procedure have been solid in their defense of the procedure and of its objectives.  The USGA is, nonetheless looking to simplify the procedure further and making its applications more consistent.[1]

            In essence, Knuth makes the bureaucratic argument that the USGA was already aware of the errors, everybody loves TSYO, and the USGA will iron out any minor kinks.  Nowhere does Knuth state how such an abysmal procedure could have left the drawing board.  To do that, Knuth would have had to be critical of himself, the USGA Handicap Research Team, and the USGA Handicap Procedure Committee.  The USGA has never been good as self-criticism, and this case was no exception.

            The response of the Southern California Golf Association (SCGA) was even weaker:

“There are many instances where this procedure (TSYO) has proven quite effective.[2] 

The SCGA goes on to cite one example where TSYO does indeed penalize an exceptional third round.  The SCGA did not recognize that a procedure that may work in some circumstances is not necessarily equitable.

TYSO was to be the USGA’s ultimate weapon in the war against sandbagging.  When it was actually deployed, however, it did not necessarily punish a player for a third exceptional score. Nor was any evidence collected that showed TYSO had any deterrent effect on sandbagging.  Harsh penalties have little effect if few are ever arrested.  A good system has to capture and punish sandbaggers while at the same time avoid false arrests of law abiding golfers.  TYSO failed to pass this simple test.  Despite the USGA’s vigorous defense of TYSO, it was quietly dropped and was never made a part of the Handicap System. Since 1997, the USGA has not made any attempt to employ new procedures in the War.  It has gone with the conventional defense embodied in Sec.10-3. As will be shown Part V, Sec. 10-3 has proved to be as effective as the Maginot Line as sandbaggers can easily find a way around it.

The first two parts of the USGA’s War on Sandbagging examined the weapons used by the USGA and their lack of effectiveness. Part III, We Have Met the Enemy, and He is Us, examines how the Handicap System actually promotes sandbagging and why the USGA may be losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the average golfer.

Appendix

“Three Strikes and You’re Out” Explained

TSYO is best described by an example.  The computed index and T-scores for the player in the example are given below.


Computed
Index
T1
T2
T3
12-Month
TSYO Total
14.0
3.5
4.5
5.5
6


Now let’s go though the calculations as set forth in TSYO.


Step 1
Determine whether three T-Scores are 3 or more strokes less than the index computed under Sec. 10-2 of the USGA Handicap Manual, 14.0.  Since the player has three T-Scores that beat his index by at least 3 strokes, we continue.
Step 2
Average T-Scores #2 and #3
                   4.5
                 +5.5
                 10.0            divided by 2 =5.0
Step 3
Subtract the result of Step 2 (5.0) from computed index, 14.0.
                 14.0
                  -5.0
                   9.0
Step 4
Refer to the Handicap Index Reduction Table (HIRT) shown below to determine the value to be used.  According to HIRT, the result of Step 3 (9.0) and the total number of T-Scores shot over the past 12 months (6) give a value of 7.0.
Step 5
Subtract value derived from HIRT (7.0) from the player’s Index.
                 14.0
                  -7.0
                   7.0
Step 6
Subtract player’s lowest T-Score in his T-score file (3.5) from the result of step 5 (7.0) to determine if a TSYO will occur.
                   7.0
                  -3.5
                   3.5
Step 7
Since the player’s lowest T-Score differential (3.5) is at least 3.0 strokes less than the result of Step 5, a TSYO adjustment will occur.  (If no TSYO adjustment is required,  repeat Steps 2 through 5 with T-1 and T-2 to determine 10-3 index.)
Step 8
TSYO Adjustment is applied by averaging the player’s 3 lowest T-scores:
                   3.5
                   4.5
                   5.5
                 13.5            divided by 3 = 4.5

  

Handicap Index Reduction Table (HIRT)

Step 3 Value
Number of Tournaments
2
3
4
5-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40+
<3.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0-4.4
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.5-4.9
1.8
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0-5.4
2.6
1.9
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.5-5.9
3.4
2.7
1.9
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.0-6.4
4.1
3.5
2.8
1.9
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.5-6.9
4.8
4.3
3.7
2.9
2.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
7.0-7.4
5.5
5.0
4.5
3.8
3.0
2.1
1.0
0.0
7.5-7.9
6.2
5.7
5.3
4.7
3.9
3.1
2.2
1.0
8.0-8.4
6.8
6.4
6.0
5.5
4.8
4.1
3.2
2.2
8.5-8.9
7.4
7.1
6.7
6.2
5.7
5.0
4.2
3.3
9.0-9.4
8.1
7.8
7.4
7.0
6.5
5.9
5.2
4.4
9.5-9.9
8.7
8.4
8.1
7.7
7.3
6.7
6.1
5.4
10.0-10.4
9.2
9.0
8.8
8.4
8.0
7.6
7.0
6.4
10.5-10.9
9.8
9.5
9.4
9.1
8.7
8.3
7.8
7.2
11.0-11.4
10.4
10.2
10.0
9.7
9.4
9.1
8.6
8.1
11.5-11.9
11.0
10.8
10.6
10.4
10.1
9.9
9.4
8.9
12.0-12.4
11.5
11.4
11.2
11.0
10.7
10.5
10.1
9.7
12.5-12.9
12.1
11.9
11.8
11.6
11.4
11.1
10.8
10.5
13.0-13.4
12.6
12.5
12.4
12.2
.12.0
11.8
11.5
11.2
13.5-13.9
13.2
13.1
12.9
12.8
12.6
12.4
12.2
11.9
14.0+
13.7
13.6
13.5
13.4
13.2
13.0
12.8
12.6




[1] Letter to author from Dean Knuth of the USGA, March 20, 1997.
[2] Letter to author from Rob Myers, Director of Club Relations, SCGA, June 11, 1997.

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