Monday, October 12, 2015

The Cost and Pricing of Golf Handicaps

Golf Associations provide a variety of services paid primarily by membership dues.  A partial list of those services would include 1) handicap administration, 2) course rating and measurements, 3) golf publications, 4) member tournaments, and 5) sometimes ownership of a golf course.   Most of the services are of little or no value to the average golfer.  The only service that is a necessity is the player’s handicap.  Golf associations, however, do not sell the handicap service separately.  Instead they follow the cable industry model and bundle all of the services for one price—You say you never watch the Hallmark Channel?  Too bad.

Associations have another advantage in that they are monopolies.  There are other organizations that sell handicap services (Myscorecard, for example), but these handicaps are generally not accepted at club tournaments.  This monopoly power lets the golf association charge higher than the free market prices for handicaps as well as bundle unwanted services.  Table 1 presents the percentage of membership dues spent on the handicap service for a sample of state golf associations.  These numbers were extracted from Income Tax Form 990 filed by each organization.  These are only rough estimates since each association accounts for costs and revenue differently.  The consistency of the percentages, however, indicates roughly 10 percent of membership dues are spent on the handicap service.

Table 1
Handicap Costs as a Percentage of Membership Dues (2013)1

Association
Membership Dues
Handicap Cost
Percentage
Colorado State Golf Association
$1,346,753
$125,141
9.3
Northern California Golf Assoc.
$6,404,947
$331,832
5.2
Oregon Golf Association
$1,380,620
$113,345
8.2
Southern California Golf Assoc.
$4,813,105
$481,260
10.0
Washington State Golf Assoc.
$1,942,900
$164,352
8.5

What does an association do with the excess revenue it collects?  Most associations would argue the money is invested for the good of the game—e.g., association golf courses, junior golf, scholarships.  These may be good endeavors, but why should a person wanting a handicap be forced to donate to the charities the association wants to support?

In truth, most of the charitable donations made by associations are small.  The Florida State Golf Association, for example, with annual revenue close to $5 million gave only $26,000 in college scholarships. More likely, bureaucracies follow the commandment “Pay thy own self first” and direct discretionary income to management salaries.  As shown in Table 2, the wages of the key executive at each association increases with the size of the membership.  With more dues there is more money to divert to staff salaries. When benefits are also included, the disparity in the compensation between the small and large associations is even more apparent.  At a membership cost of $40, for example, it takes over eight thousand members to pay the total compensation of the Executive Director of the Southern California Golf Association.[1]  It would only take slightly over 3000 members to cover the total compensation of the Executive Director of the Oregon Golf Association.  

Table 2
Reportable Compensation of Key Employees (2013)*

Association
Key Employee
Total Wages
Colorado State Golf Association
Edward Mate
$131,887
Florida State Golf Association
Jim Demick
$246,750
Northern California Golf Assoc.
Lyn Nelson
$247,640
Oregon Golf Association
Barbara Trammell
$128,890
Southern California Golf Assoc.
Kevin Heaney
$239,971
Texas Golf Association
Rob Addington
$373,177
                * Does not include retirement, deferred compensation, and nontaxable benefits.

A counter explanation of the correlation between association size and salaries is large corporations pay their chief executive officers more than small corporations so the varying salary levels at associations should be expected.  The difference is large corporations have billions of dollars at stake and face stiff competition.   Golf associations face no such threat.  They own a monopoly that is almost impossible to challenge.  The executive director of a golf association does not have to make decisions that could make or break the association.  He or she only has to keep the governing board happy.  This can usually be accomplished by giving board members a blue blazer and outings on the better courses in the state.  The skills needed to run large or small associations are basically the same.  That leaves the size of an association as the best explanation of salary level.

For most players, the cost of a membership in an association is a negligible part of their golf budget.  The demand for membership will not be very sensitive to price for these players.  The price may be too high, however, for the casual player whose golf budget is limited—the type of player that needs to be reached if the game is to expand.  Will associations lower the cost of handicaps to attract this player?  If a cafeteria plan was adopted where players could choose “handicap only,” the revenue base of associations would be cut dramatically.  This would mean a reduction in salaries and personnel. The adoption of such a plan is unlikely since bureaucracies are genetically predisposed to follow another basic commandment, “Do not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.”      






[1] In 2013, the Executive director of the SCGA received $239,971 in base compensation, $51,170 in retirement and deferred compensation, and $4,158 in nontaxable benefits, for a total of $333,299.  Of course the big pay waits if you make it to the USGA.  The Executive Director of the USGA received $812,000 in total compensations.  When an executive goes from a state association to the USGA, he or she can expect a salary bump of around $200,000.

Friday, September 11, 2015

How Golf Handicaps Changed the World: A Parable

It was a cold and wintry London night.  Inside at the British Museum Reading Room, Karl Marx found his mind  muddled by a fog as dense as that on the Thames. He stared at the blank paper before him  and questioned whether he was capable of formulating a new economic system.

Seeking inspiration,  Marx paced through the stacks where he happened upon an R&A member, Reggie Threepwood, who was researching his lineage back to the Duke of Norfolk. Somehow the conversation turned to golf and its peculiar handicap system.  Reggie railed against the injustice he suffered in his latest two-ball and patiently explained how the handicap system worked.  “It takes strokes from each according to ability, and gives strokes to each according to need,” Reggie scoffed.  Marx abruptly announced with elation "I have found my muse," and rushed back to his desk to begin writing. 
  
After Marx’s departure, Reggie detailed how the handicap system was plagued by greed, sloth, acceptance of mediocrity, and unethical behavior. These are the same human frailties that would eventually doom Marx’s new economic order.  Greed shows itself when those in charge do not distribute resources evenly.  Reggie complained prize money was awarded equally to low-gross and low-net players in a recent tournament.  Since he carried a 14-handicap, he had no chance for a gross prize. He had to grovel with the other net players for the few crumbs set aside for them.  “The Committee believes all players are equal, but some players are more equal than others,” he groused.

Reggie continued his harangue to a small group of mostly disinterested listeners.  He posited the handicap system promoted sloth.  He had lost his recent two-ball match to Colonel Emsworth whose handicap had risen through lackadaisical play.  “If you play poorly long enough,” Reggie harrumphed, “you are most certainly going to win.”  More disturbing to Reggie was the Colonel was not embarrassed by his victory and accepted his mediocrity with aplomb. “This tore at the very fabric that made England great and did not portend well for the future of the nation,” Reggie lectured.

The Colonel did lose his next match to Sir Bernard Twistleton, the Earl of Sandbag.  This gave Reggie no comfort since the Earl was notorious for playing poorly in four-balls when his partner had the hole well in hand.  This unethical behavior gave the Earl “a couple of strokes in the bag” he could pull out when needed.  He had never lost a match when more than a quid was at stake.  Reggie believed the Earl was not corrupted by the usual suspects, liquor and gaming, but by a more insidious temptress, the handicap system. 

Reggie recounted his complaints about the handicap system to the Club Secretary, Captain Wodehouse.  Captain Wodehouse was sympathetic to Reggie’s cause.  He had long been amused by the foibles of the aristocratic members.  There were a few who kept their handicap unrealistically low.  These were the men whose every conversation ultimately turned to their time at Eton.  More common were members who treated a reduction in handicap like dipping their toe in the icy North Sea and quickly retreating to shore and the comfort of their customary handicap.

Captain Wodehouse’s theory was confirmed by the work of economist Angus Loaffer.  Loaffer had developed an eponymous curve relating golf winnings to a player’s handicap.   Loaffer sketched his curve on a napkin for the Captain at his going away party-Loaffer was emigrating to America.  It showed any movement in a player’s handicap from his optimum resulted in losses.  If a player’s handicap decreases, the player loses an edge.  If the player’s handicap increases, opposing players either lower the stakes or boycott him altogether.  Therefore, players tend to find their optimum handicap and stay there.  The discussion with Reggie reminded the Captain that Loaffer never did pay the incidental charge for the napkin on his closing bill.  To his credit, Loafer had followed the Captain's suggestion and dropped the “o” from his surname at Ellis Island so it was no longer a synonym for indolence.  Since Loaffer had proved so amendable to his advice, the Captain would return the favor and write-off the napkin as a miscellaneous expense.   
 
As Club Secretary, however, the Captain was duty bound to defend the status quo so he argued “Only a handicap system can ensure equitable competition between players of different abilities.”  Reggie thought this a small benefit, however, since scratch players rarely troll the locker room looking for a 36-handicap to fill out the foursome.  Players of equal ability tend to group together mirroring the rigid hierarchical social structure in England. “Within my level of play,” Reggie countered, “I find it more equitable to negotiate strokes rather than rely on handicap cards.  If we can agree on strokes, then both players think it a fair contract. When you ask a player his handicap, you put his honor stake.  If he hits shots inconsistent with his handicap claim, he is to be avoided in the future.  If you rely on the handicap system, then you put the onus for accuracy on the handicap card and not the player where it should be.” 

Captain Wodehouse then gave Reggie a hypothetical.  Say you meet a stranger on the first tee at St. Andrews.  Without a handicap system, how could you ensure a fair match?  Reggie was not swayed.  “First, I see a stranger as a potential friend and not a potential mark.  There is no better bonding experience than navigating the perils of the Old Course together.  I want to commiserate if he finds himself in Hell Bunker, and not benefit from his misfortune.  Meeting people on the first tee is one of the great pleasures of golf.  To spoil it by suggesting a bet should be grounds for expulsion from the R&A.”   

Captain Wodehouse saw Reggie remained unconvinced and tried another tack.  “Without the portability of handicaps our Member/Guest would not be possible,” the Captain argued.  Reggie, however, viewed this as a good thing.  At the last Member/Guest he had to stand in a food line like some waif from a Dickens’ novel.   Then there was his brother-in-law he was obligated to invite who for one week a year had an unquenchable thirst for the most expensive single malt scotch the club had to offer.  The only saving grace of abundant liquor was it made you overlook the winner who sported a 20-handicap and had a swing like old Tom Morris.  “I was just lucky,” he will say.  Reggie thought the winner of any large field event should be fitted for leg irons rather than given a trophy.  No, the Member/Guest could go the way of the Dodo bird and Reggie would be fine with it.

Though his audience had dwindled to a few, Reggie mused about the other sports he enjoyed—football, rugby, billiards, lawn tennis, and croquet.  None labored under the yoke of a handicap system yet continued to thrive and be enjoyed by multitudes.  “Why is golf different,” he wondered.  Could golf ever become so pure players abandoned the handicap system?  He saw it as unlikely for two reasons.  First, the other sports he enjoyed did not require vast tracts of land or large on-going maintenance expenditures.  To make a golf club financially viable, there needed to be a large number of members.  In most cases that required recruiting bad golfers to join.  An attractive and necessary inducement for membership would be the handicap system that makes even the novice player competitive, a status he might never earn in other sports.  Second, he foresaw a burgeoning bureaucracy whose very existence rested on the sale of handicaps.  Handicap sales will beget handicap tournaments which will beget more handicap sales, and so on.  The bureaucracy will ensure a handicap is to golf what a deed is to property ownership. You cannot be without it.

Reggie ended what was now a soliloquy by enjoining, “The handicap system is here to stay, but there are ways to keep one’s integrity and minimize the system’s downside.  Try to find players of similar ability and convince them to play matches at scratch or at negotiated handicaps.  Use your handicap as a measure of performance and not as a cudgel for extracting insignificant pecuniary gains from your fellow competitors.  And to retain self-esteem after a series of losses, remember winners of handicap events are either lucky or have an unscrupulous handicap.  Neither is a cause for celebration.”  



Postscript:  Marx went on to finish his seminal work, Das Kapital.  The movement it inspired led to much misery and death in the 20th century.  In Marx’s defense, turgid economic treatises are rarely the cause of such mayhem, and that is probably the case here.  The Laffer (nee Loaffer) Curve finally found its niche when it related tax revenue to tax rates.  The theory behind the curve, termed Supply Side Economics, was the driving force behind the boom in the American economy which ironically led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Captain Wodehouse’s journal about life at the club was eventually passed to his grandson Pelham, known familiarly as P.G.  It may have been the basis for some of P.G’s farcical novels.  As for Reggie, he fell to his death while trying to retrieve his guttie at a cliffside golf course near Cornwall.  At the inquest, his playing companion testified Reggie only searched for his guttie as a diversion will waiting for a dawdling twosome to clear the green.  While slow play couldn’t be listed as the cause of death, it was certainly a contributing factor. His home club placed a plaque in his memory on the first tee.  It read:

Reginald “Reggie” Threepwood

He played golf the way it was meant to be played, with honour and quickly.

Please do the same.

Thursday, August 13, 2015

Revising Decision 6-2/1 of the Rules of Golf

The problem with Rule 6-2/1 of the Rules of Golf has been discussed previously (see The Case for Eliminating Decision 3-5/2 for the USGA Handicap System, 4/16/2015).  It is brought up again to illustrate the difficulty when two organizations (USGA and the R&A) try to write rules governing different handicap systems.  To refresh, here is the decision:  

Meaning of "Handicap"
Q. Under a handicapping system where the player has to adjust his handicap in accordance with the rating for the course he is playing, a player's handicap before adjustment is 4.8. After applying the appropriate adjustment for the course and the tees to be used for that competition, the player's handicap is 6. Which is his "handicap" for the purposes of Rule 6-2?
A. 6.  In a stroke-play competition the player must ensure that the handicap for the course that he is to play and the tees to be used is recorded on his score card when it is returned to the Committee.
The Decision refers to a player with a handicap of 4.8. A handicap expressed to the first decimal does not exist in the USGA Handicap System.  I suspect the Rules Brahmans were trying to say a player was responsible for recording his Course Handicap and not his Handicap Index.   “Index,” however, is specific to the USGA Handicap System.   They needed a more generic term, but made of mess of things by citing a handicap that does not exist in any of the major handicap systems.  Australia has a GA Handicap that is expressed in decimals which is the equivalent of a USGA Index.  This Decision, however, predates the GA Handicap.  The Council of National Golf Unions (CONGU) has an Exact Handicap also expressed in decimals. The CONGU Handicap System is excluded from this Decision since CONGU Playing Handicaps are not adjusted for the rating of the course being played.  Decisions are supposed to clarify the Rules of Golf.  This Decision fails that test.

It should have been sufficient to state in rule 6-2 a player is responsible for recording his Course Handicap. The anomaly of a 4.8 handicap should have been detected and corrected long ago.  A failure of regulatory bodies is to dwell on new regulations (e.g., anchor putting) rather than reviewing existing regulations for their efficacy.  Though the USGA has been made aware of this problem, look for Decision 6-2/1 to live on.   



Monday, July 27, 2015

Estimating a Player’s Index under Various Handicap Systems


There is no doubt handicap systems differ from country to country.  The question is “How big are those differences?”  To examine this question, the scoring records of six United States players were selected.    Using these scores, an estimate of a player’s Index was made for 5 of 6 major handicap systems—data limitations prevented using the sixth system.  The term “Index” is used throughout even though it is peculiar to the United States Golf Association (USGA) System.  Index as used here represents each system’s measurement of a player’s ability. The broad outlines of each handicap system and the assumptions made in estimating the player’s index are detailed below:

USGA Handicap System – Both competitive and non-competitive rounds are allowed.  Scores are not adjusted based on playing conditions.  A player’s handicap differential is his gross adjusted score minus the course rating multiplied by the ratio of 113/Slope Rating.   The maximum score a player can take on a hole is determined by his handicap (e.g., a handicap between 10 and 19 is allowed to take a 7).  A player’s Index is the average of his ten best differentials multiplied by .96 and truncated to one decimal.

Council of National Golf Unions (CONGU) – Only rounds made in competition are used.  The USGA’s Slope Rating system is not used.  Course Rating can be adjusted based on the scores of players.  For various levels of Indices, a buffer zone is defined (e.g., 0 to 2 strokes above the Course Rating).  If a player’s net score falls within the buffer zone, his Index is not changed.  If his net score is above the buffer zone, 0.1 is added to his Index.  If his net score is below the Course Rating by n-strokes, his Index is reduced by n times the adjustment factor for his Index level (e.g., the adjustment factor is 0.2 for players with an Index between 5.5 and 12.4).
In estimating a player’s CONGU Index, the USGA Course Rating rounded to the nearest integer was used.  It was assumed the rounds were played under normal conditions so there was no adjustment to the Course Rating.  A player’s CONGU Index was assumed to be his USGA Index on the date of the oldest of his 20 scores.  The player’s handicap was his CONGU Index rounded to the nearest integer.   Starting with his oldest score, the player’s net score was calculated.  If the net score triggered an adjustment, the player’s Index was changed and a new handicap calculated.  This procedure was used for all 20 scores.

Australia – All rounds played under the Rules of Golf are used.  Australia uses the USGA Course and Slope Rating System but rounds the Course Rating to the nearest integer.  The maximum score that can be taken on a hole is a net double bogey.  For handicap purposes, a Daily Course Rating (DCR) is estimated.   A player’s differential is based on his Stableford score and is calculated as follows:
   Course Par plus Handicap minus (Stableford Points minus 36) = A
                                                                   A minus the DCR = B
                                                                B multiplied by 113 = C
                                                 C divided by the Slope Rating = D
                                            D (rounded to one decimal place) = Differential

The Australian Index is based on the average of a player’s 8 best differentials out of 20 multiplied by .93.  It is assumed rounds were played under normal conditions and differences in posted scores adjusted for stroke control are minimal.  Australia’s differential calculation is approximately the same as in the USGA system.   Therefore, the estimate of the Australian Index was found by using USGA differentials, taking the average of the eight best differentials, multiplying by .93, and truncating the result to the first decimal.

South Africa – All rounds played under the Rules of Golf are used.  Currently, South Africa has not adopted the Slope Rating system.  The Course Rating is expressed as an integer.  Maximum score on any hole is 2 over par except where a player has two handicap strokes on a hole in which case the maximum score allowed is 3 over par for that hole.  The differential is the player’s adjusted gross score minus the Course Rating.   A player’s Index is the average of his 10 best differentials out of 20 multiplied by .96.  If a player has two exceptional scores (i.e., a net score of 3 or more below the Course Rating), his Index is based on his best eight scores.
In estimating the South African Index, it was assumed the South African Course Rating was the USGA Course Rating rounded to the nearest integer.   Differences in posted scores due to differences in stroke control were assumed to be minimal.

Argentina – Only scores from competitions are used.  Argentina has a Course Rating system loosely based on the USGA’s system.   There is no Slope Rating.  There is no equitable stroke control.  The handicap differential is the player’s gross score minus the Course Rating.  A player’s Index is the average of a player’s 8 best scores out his last 16 scores multiplied .87. 
In estimating the Argentina Index, it is assumed the USGA Course Rating is equivalent to the Argentina Course Rating.  Differences due to different stroke control procedures were assumed to be minimal.

European Golf Association (EGA) – The EGA has adopted the USGA Course and Slope Rating System.   A player’s Index is based primarily on rounds in competition.   A player’s handicap is his Index multiplied by 113/Slope Rating + Course Rating – Par rounded to the nearest integer.  The Index adjustment process is similar to the CONGU system.   A score below a player’s Stableford buffer zone leads to a .1 increase in a player’s Index.  A Stableford score n-points above the buffer zone leads to a decrease of n times the adjustment factor for his Index level (e.g., .2 for a player with an Index between 4.5 and 11.4).  Based on score in the competition the buffer zone can be shifted up or down.  Because par is not known and the uncertainty in converting stroke play scores to Stableford scores, the player’s EGA Index is not estimated.

The estimated Index for a selection of players is shown in the Table below.  The Australian Index is usually the lowest since it is based on a player’s 8 best scores as opposed to his 10 best in the USGA system.   South Africa is typically the highest Index since differentials are not adjusted by the Slope Rating.  If all scores were at a course with a Slope Rating of 125, for example, the South African Index would be approximately 11 percent higher than the USGA Index.

Table
Estimate of Player Index by Major Handicap System

System
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Player 4
Player 5
Paler 6
USGA
7.3
12.9
9.9
4.4
6.4
19.0
CONGU
8.3
14.2
9.2
5.2
6.7
19.6
Australia
6.6
11.9
9.2
3.7
6.0
18.1
South Africa
8.5
14.7
11.8
4.8
7.2
20.5
Argentina
7.5
12.9
10.3
4.4
7.2
19.0
EGA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

In general, the USGA Index is within ±1 of the Index in the other systems.  Such discrepancies, while not negligible, do not create significant inequities.  One remedy would be a Worldwide Handicap System (WHS). But there are less expensive remedies available.  Australians could have their Index increased when playing in the United States.  South Africans playing in the United States would not be permitted to use the Slope Rating to calculate their handicap since the Slope Rating was not used to calculate their Index.  These ad hoc solutions for what is social golf make more economic sense than spending millions on a WHS to correct a rare and minor injustice.  

Monday, June 8, 2015

A Global Handicap System: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come

A column by John Paul Newport (“The Handicap May Finally Go Global,” The Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2015) describes the USGA’s effort to establish a uniform handicap system.  Newport dutifully transcribed everything John Bodenhamer of the USGA told him, but a strong case was never made for implementing a global system.[1]  

Combining a number of systems into one can sometimes make sense.  Having a common currency seems efficient unless one of the countries is Greece.  Having a standard railway track gauge would have benefits unless your neighbor is Germany.  Having one ruling body for a sport would be efficient unless that ruling body is FIFA.  These examples demonstrate standardization is not always a good thing.  It creates monopoly power which can lead to less independence and higher costs for participating members. 

Any global handicap system should meet three requirements to be cost/effective.  First, there should be important benefits attributable to combining handicap systems.   Second, the global system should be so much better it warrants the disruption and suppression of regional systems.  Third, cost savings should benefit the participating parties.  Before examining whether a proposed system meets these requirements, we first hypothesize what a global handicap system will likely look like.

What Would a Global Handicap System Look Like?

It seems clear the USGA will be advocating for its handicap system to become the world standard.  Newport calls it by far the “most sophisticated” in the world.   It is not.  The USGA’s Course and Slope Rating models are flawed and have never been empirically verified.   Nevertheless, the USGA is heavily invested in its handicap system and is unlikely to accept major modifications in the interest of global uniformity. 

The USGA can also argue its system is already used in most parts of the world.  To ensure the global system does not have a Made in America stamp, Bodenhamer only suggests incorporating a Daily Course Rating (DCR) which currently exists in both the Australian and CONGU handicap systems.[2]

Another reason for believing the global system will closely resemble the USGA’s system is monetary.  The two major handicapping systems (USGA and CONGU) are different and incompatible.   In creating a global system, one of the systems will have to go.  The USGA’s system is designed to make handicaps available to as wide a population as possible.  Any organization can become a USGA licensee and sell handicaps if it meets minimal requirements.  Some of these organizations do not hold tournaments on a regular basis, if at all.  The CONGU handicap system bases a player’s handicap only on tournament scores.  Once a player has established an “exact handicap,” his handicap will increase, decrease, or remain the same based on his score in each tournament.  

It seems doubtful the USGA could ever accept a system similar to the CONGU System.   The casual player would have no reason to maintain a handicap if it was based on tournaments in which he rarely played.   If a CONGU-like system was adopted, it would result in a large decrease in handicap sales.  Such a drop would be catastrophic to golf associations who depend on the profit from selling handicaps to subsidize their other operations.[3] 

For the reasons of “pride of authorship,” widespread use, and monetary considerations, the USGA could only accept a global system that closely resembles its current system.  Without the USGA there is no global system.  Therefore, it is assumed a slightly modified USGA handicap system becomes the global handicap system.  Next, the global system is examined to see if it passes the three tests for a cost/effective system listed above.

Are There Important Benefits to the Global Handicap System?

Newport relates the following story to demonstrate the benefit of a global handicap system:

Say you meet a 12-handicap golfer from Australia on the first tee at St. Andrews in Scotland.  If your U.S handicap index also happens to be a 12, you might suggest a friendly money game, with no strokes given.  Bad move.

The bet is not a “bad move” as Newport argues, but it is an ungracious move.[4]  I have been paired with hundreds of strangers all around the world and have never asked or been asked to play a match.  It would reinforce the image of the ugly American if I immediately requested my foreign playing partner to pony up for a $5 Nassau.  One of the great benefits of golf is meeting people from all walks of life on the first tee.   I have always assumed my new partners are there to enjoy the golf and consider the course, especially St. Andrews, to be the competition.  Are there a sufficient number of encounters between players of different countries to justify the myriad of costs associated with a global handicap system?  It appears unlikely.[5]  

Is the Global Handicap System Really Better?

Adding a DCR to the USGA handicap system has the illusion, if not the substance, of increased accuracy.    It will cost an unknown amount to implement a DCR, but the benefits may be ethereal.  Here are some reasons why:
·         A round played under adverse conditions will probably not be among a player’s best ten (best eight in Australia) scores used in calculating a player’s index.   In which case, it would have only a marginal effect on a player’s index (e.g., it could push out a low score from the last 20 scores).
·         Conditions often change between the morning and afternoon as demonstrated repeatedly on the PGA Tour.  If conditions were benign in the morning but rough in the afternoon, an algorithm using the DCR would estimate the morning players to be better than they really are.
·         Australia has had a DCR for some time.  Golf Australia (Australia’s equivalent of the USGA) has not published any research showing that the DCR has a significant effect on a player’s index.  I suspect Golf Australia does not test the efficacy of the DCR for the same reason the USGA  never tests the efficacy Slope System—neither may like the results.[6]
·         Going to a DCR will introduce even more errors into the beleaguered handicap system.[7]   There will be model errors (i.e., does the estimating model accurately reflect reality?), sampling errors, and conversion errors in making Stableford scores consistent with stroke play scores.   

A USGA style handicap system has much looser controls on the malevolent player.  In the USGA handicap system, a player can play alone, post a score, and not turn in a scorecard.  His non-tournament scores count the same as his tournament scores.[8]  He is also allowed to take a high number on a hole (e.g., a seven on a par 3 for a 10-19 handicap).  Peer review is also non-existent at many affiliate clubs (i.e., clubs without a course) where members may not even have a nodding acquaintance.[9]  If these USGA controls are incorporated into the global system, it would be difficult to argue the new system is more equitable than the present CONGU handicap system.

The true value of many golf statistics (e.g., Course Rating, Slope Rating, and a Player’s Handicap) cannot be measured.  This makes it impossible to determine if a global system actually reduces the estimating error in a player’s Index.    If there were two systems for estimating a player’s weight, for example, the more accurate system could be found by seeing how close each system predicts a player’s true weight.  If a global handicap system estimates a player’s Index at 11.6 while the old system puts him at 11.9, there is no way to determine which system is better since a player’s true index is unknown.  The USGA will argue the global handicap system should give a more accurate estimate since it incorporates more variables, uses complex models, and costs a lot of money.  In truth, the USGA will have no idea if accuracy is improved and if so by how much.    

Are There Cost Savings Benefiting Participating Parties?

The global handicap system does not appear to generate any major cost savings.  If it is administered centrally, having every golf score whizzing around the world in order to have a DCR for every course, is a costly use of the telecommunication spectrum.  If the global handicap system is administered on a country-by-country basis, then there certainly are no economies of scale to be had.  It is even probable costs would increase.  
  
While costs are not going to be lower, they can be shifted.   Bodenhamer makes an economic argument for various associations to adopt the global handicap system when he states the USGA and R&A will jointly bear the costs for maintaining and updating the system.[10]   Newport does not make clear who will benefit from this subsidy.  If regional associations no longer have to pay for handicap services they could be a net beneficiary.  Handicap costs, however, are a relatively small part of the budget of most associations.  Eliminating this cost is a small economic incentive and is unlikely to be a major determinant in deciding between a global handicap system and the status quo.

Summary and Conclusion

A global handicap system appears to have only a small benefit, may not increase the equity of competition, could be costly, and is sure to infuriate many who like their present system (i.e., CONGU).  In essence, there are no strong arguments for a global handicap system.   The movement for a global system does not appear to come from players, but rather from the bureaucracy.  It could be part of the USGA’s continuing quest for hegemony over the world of golf.  The USGA is now the dominant partner in rules and equipment specifications.   A logical next step would be to add handicaps to its portfolio.  If centralizing control of the handicap system is the USGA’s objective, it needs to explain why such a move would be in the best interest of the game.




[1] John Bodenhamer is the Senior Managing Director of Rules, Competition, and Equipment at the USGA.  Note the absence of “handicapping” in his title.  In fact, none of the USGA’s senior leadership team has “handicapping” in their job title. This gives the impression handicapping is not all that important within the bureaucracy of the USGA.
[2] CONGU stands for the Council of National Golf Unions and is the handicap authority in Great Britain and Ireland.
[3] A typical golf association charges around $40 for a membership which includes a USGA handicap.  It probably costs $2 to provide the handicap leaving the association to spend $38 as it sees fit.
[4] Had Newport examined the Australian handicap system, he would have known this was not a “bad move.”  A player’s Golf Australia handicap is the same as an Index in the U.S.  If both players have the same Index, the U.S. player is better than the Australian Player.  There are four reasons for this.  First, Australia uses the best eight scores while the U.S. uses the best ten scores in computing a player’s index.   If the two players had the same scoring record, the Australian’s Index would be lower.  Second, Golf Australia decreases the average of the eight best scores by .93.  The U.S. decreases the average of the ten best scores by .96 (i.e., the Bonus for Excellence).  Again, with the same scoring record, the Australian’s index would be lower.  Third, equitable stroke control is much tougher in Australia.  Australia uses Stableford scoring to compute a player’s index.  That means the highest score an Australian can take is a double bogey.  So if both players took a 7 on a par three, the Australian would post a 5 while the American would (if he was between a 10 and 19 handicap) post a 7.  The Australian then gets the lower index even both players scored the same.  Fourth, Golf Australia computes a Daily Course Rating.  On a tough weather day, the Australian has his handicap differential reduced.  The American does not.
[5] George Peper in his book Two Years at St. Andrews (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2006) documents his travails with the differences in handicap systems between the United States and Scotland.  Nowhere in the book does Peper argue for a global handicap system.  He probably realized he was not in Scotland to win matches, but to enjoy the experience.  He adapted to the Scottish system and flourished.   
[6] See Dougharty, Laurence, “The Selling of the Slope Handicap System: The Big Con?” www.ongolfhandicaps, March 24, 2015.  A small sample of players was used to examine the effect of the Slope Rating on a player’s scoring differential.  The effect was small and statistically insignificant, but that may be due to the small sample size.
[7] The USGA Handicap System contains many self-admitted biases.  There is sampling error in using only 20 scores.  The handicap estimate is also a lagging indicator of a player’s current ability.  There are numerous rounding errors made in the calculation of a player’s index and his subsequent course handicap.  There are errors in the estimates of the Course and Slope Ratings that in turn lead to errors in the estimate of a player’s handicap.  Then there are the errors caused by the dubious character of some players (sandbaggers).
[8] In theory, Sec. 10-3 of the USGA Handicap System reduces a player’s Index for exceptional tournament performance.  In practice, however, this section is ineffective.
[9] See Dougharty, Laurence “The Pacific Amateur Golf Tournament: If You Go,” www.ongolfhandicaps, December 5, 2014.  A player from an affiliate club won the Pacific Amateur two years in a row but never posted the championship round from either year.
[10] There are also legal and economic consequences to a global system that incorporates a DCR.  Under the DCR, a player’s index is influenced not just how he plays, but by how others play.  This means the services of many private companies that provide handicaps services to various golf associations and individuals will be will be forced out of the market.  An example would be MyScorecard which provides handicaps under a USGA license for $14.95 per year.  A player uses the internet to send MyScorecard his scores, and MyScorecard uses the USGA’s formula to calculate the player’s index.  Under the proposed system, MyScorecard could no longer provide an independent handicap service because it would not have access to the scores of other players.  The proposed system must of necessity create a worldwide monopoly that controls scoring data—basically a super GHIN.  The USGA lost a court case when it tried to restrict who could use its handicap formula.  The proposed system is a more subtle form of restricting trade.  Anyone can use the proposed formula, but no one outside of the monopoly will have access to the data to implement the new system.  Therefore, the business model of organizations like MyScorecard would be dead.  How the courts will view this restraint of trade is anyone’s guess.