Showing posts with label USGA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USGA. Show all posts

Friday, May 27, 2016

The R&A Battles for Gender Equality: Or Does It?


The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews(R&A) recently announced Muirfield Golf Club would no longer be considered as a site for The Open Championship.  The announcement was pure political theater since Muirfield was not up in the rotation for a considerable number of years.  The R&A’s intent was to show its enlightenment on issues of gender equality to placate sponsors of its golden goose—The Open.  The R&A had a lot of work to do to clean-up its bona fides as a civil rights champion.  After all, for 260 years the R&A had the same policy of barring women from membership that Muirfield was now being pilloried for.  Here are some alternatives the R&A might have considered for image control and why it chose to do what it did (i.e., alternative 4):

1. Cancel this year’s Open Championship at Royal Troon Golf Club which also does not allow women members - This step would dramatically demonstrate how seriously the R&A takes the issue.  While it might punish Royal Troon, it would wreak more economic harm on the R&A.  Better to argue Troon was awarded the Open by a previous administration of the R&A, have the television announcers “tsk, tsk” the men only policy, and reap the millions The Open will bring. 

2. Atone for years of discrimination by putting itself on probation and granting sole control over the Rules of Golf for 5 years to the United States Golf Association (USGA) - The problem with this alternative is some of the nabobs of the USGA were members of the R&A during the heyday of sexual discrimination.  The USGA should not benefit from a crime in which it abetted.  David Fay, former Executive Director of the USGA comes to mind.  While he famously resigned form the all male Pine Valley Club, he kept his membership in the R&A. It is more likely the notoriously parsimonious Fay left Pine Valley because he didn’t want to pay the dues rather than from any moral convictions.

Mike Davis, the current Executive Director of the USGA does not appear to have cleaner hands.  He too is probably a member of Pine Valley since he posts scores from there.  He was a member at Trump National, New Jersey until Donald Trump found disfavor with the liberal elites.  When The Donald was a fringe candidate and given little hope of winning, Davis was quick to announce the USGA was reconsidering holding the US Women’s Open at Trump National.[1]  Since Trump won the Republican nomination, Davis has been mute on relocating the tournament. 
 
If the R&A were to cede control, it must find an organization with a much better record on gender equality and that also has the courage of its convictions.  That would not be the USGA.

3. Assume control the Women’s British Open and give equal prize money to men and women - The R&A is in the process of merging with the Ladies Golf Union which owns the rights to the Women’s British Open.  Currently, the difference in total purses between the two Opens is about $7 million.  To get rid of the title sponsor of the Women’s Open (Ricoh) would probably cost an additional $1 million or more.  What price is the R&A willing to play to demonstrate its commitment to full gender equality?  It is probably somewhere south of $8 million a year.

4. Issue a press release chastising Muirfield and announce its removal from the rota until Club members vote for a more inclusive membership policy – This alternative would give the R&A moral high ground and be cost free.   In the meantime, Muirfield would be encouraged to follow the R&A’s lead by inviting a few women to join. The three main arguments would go like this:
  • Women want the right to be a member more than they want to be a member.   If the membership becomes open to women, the Club may have to recruit women to prove it has an inclusive membership policy. It is likely women memberships will top off at 1 percent of the total membership as they do at the R&A and Augusta.  Does Muirfield really want to take to the barricades over this minor incursion?
  • It’s not like Muirfield is all male club where women are not permitted on the grounds.  Female tourists and member’s wives are mulling around all the time.  A few more women will not be noticed and they have the upside of paying dues.  True, Sir Edgar will have to more careful about where he takes a leak.  Lose the Open or fit Sir Edgar with a catheter?  Take your pick.
  • If Muirfield is not in the rota, tourists will not pay as much to play it.  This will be an income hit for the club.  The only way to make up for the loss is for the members to pay more for dues and/or liquor.  Will single malt scotch taste as good at twice the price?  

There is little doubt the Muirfield membership will eventually find these arguments compelling.  With that settled, Muirfield will resume its place in the rota.  The R&A will be praised for its tough stand that brought about change, and Muirfield will be extolled for its enlightened, if belated, policy.   In essence, everything appears to change, but nothing really changes--the perfect bureaucratic solution.
                    




[1] Mell, Randell, “Davis: USGA ‘evaluating things’ regarding Trump, Golf Central Blog, July 9, 2015.

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

The Unmaking of the USGA's Appendix E

The only thing the USGA hates more than making a mistake is admitting to one.  Examples of this behavior are numerous.  The most famous (or infamous) was the USGA’s defense of the Masters for not disqualifying Tiger Woods in 2013. The USGA argued this was an exceptional case and would determine whether any “adjustment to the Rules and/or Decisions is appropriate.”[1]  The USGA’s curious logic, however, was never memorialized in the Decisions.  Its omission was due to the only exceptional circumstance being the Masters Tournament Committee was headed by a former president of the USGA.[2]  Since this is a circumstance unlikely to be repeated, the USGA apparently thought it best to paper over the error and move on.

The USGA’s proclivity for dissembling even reaches down to those responsible for the handicap system.  This post examines the truthfulness of the USGA in defending Appendix E, Exceptional Tournament Score Probability Table, of the USGA Handicap System.  This example is not chosen because of its importance to the handicap system.  It really has none.  Its selection is based on two other reasons.  First, if the USGA is less than straightforward on minor issues like Appendix E, it does not portend well for its actions on major issues.  Second, Appendix E should be a place for the USGA to demonstrate its competence in probability theory which is the backbone of the handicap system.  If the USGA errs here, similar missteps can be inferred in the more important elements of the handicap system (e.g., validity of the Slope System, allocation of handicap strokes, handicap allowances).

For many years the probability table in the Appendix E looked like that shown in Table 1 below.  The text explained “The values in the table are the odds (sic) of shooting a net differential equal to or better than the number in the left column.”[3]  The USGA wrote “odds” when it meant “probability.”  When this error was pointed out, the USGA made the correction without admitting its previous error. 

Table 1
Exceptional Tournament Score Probability Table 2006-2007 (Abbreviated)

Net
Differential
Handicap Index Ranges
0-5
6-12
13-21
22-30
30 or Greater
0
5
5
5
5
5
-1
10
10
10
8
7
-2
23
22
21
13
10

While the probabilities (i.e., the inverse of the table values) presented in the Table 1 could be questioned, at least they made sense.  This changed with the 2012-2015 edition of the USGA Handicap System where the probability table took on a new form as shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Exceptional Tournament Score Probability Table 2012-2015 (Abbreviated)

Net
Differential
Handicap Index Ranges
5.9 or Less
6.0-12.9
13.0-21.9
22.0-30.9
31.0 or Greater
0 to -.9
5
5
5
5
5
-1.0 to -1.9
10
10
10
8
7
-2.0 to -2.9
23
22
21
13
10

The text in Appendix E again explained “The values in the table represent the probability of shooting a Net Differential equal to or better than the number in the left column.”[4]  The problem is there is no longer a “number” in the left column but a “range” of numbers.  A simple examination of the normal curve would show the probability of shooting a net differential of 0 or better differs greatly from the probability of shooting a net differential of -.9 or better.   This discrepancy in the Appendix was pointed out to the USGA along with many typographical errors in the table.[5]    Scott Hovde, Assistant Director of Handicap and Course Rating, did not accept the criticism and defended the change as an improvement:

When reviewing the entire Handicap manual for the 2012 update, we looked at the table in Appendix E to determine if it needed some tweaking or updating.  The initial thought was to remove the table from the book altogether and only supply an online version once the table was fully reviewed.  In consulting with a few of our HRT members (who were involved with the original table), it was decided to keep Appendix E in the book, but expand the rows to ranges, as the formula (and example) listed underneath the table to determine the net differential is taken to the tenth place.  The values in each cell represented an average of the probability of net differentials within that range, and not just a single net differential.  In reality each 0.1 difference in net differential will have a separate probability, but that table would be far too large to be of use.  
In the interest of ease of use by our target audience, the ranges were there to keep them from having to interpolate and just plug in the net differential, and probability was listed in each cell as the divisor, instead of probability itself (so 1200 instead of .0008333…)…The typos in the manual were unfortunately made at the printer when they formatted the table for final printing, the table we submitted and that was reviewed by all involved had the correct values. [6] 

Hovde does admit to the typos, but argues the mistake was not the USGA’s, but the printer’s.  For this to be true, it must be believed the USGA did not request, receive, and copy edit a proof copy before publication.  In other words, Hovde’s defense implies the USGA was guilty of gross negligence.    

The most charitable interpretation of Hovde’s meandering syntax is that cell values represent the probability of a Net Differential equal to or better than some average value within the range.  In the case of a range from 0 to -.9, for example, the cell value represents the probability of a Net Differential equal to or better than -.45 (i.e., an average value).   The user will still have to interpolate if he wants a more accurate estimate of the probability.  So listing ranges is not a benefit to the user as Hovde claims.

Hovde argues members of the Handicap Research Team (HRT) agreed with this new formulation.  The probabilities, however, did not change with the new edition.  If the cell values are really “average” probabilities, all previous editions have been incorrect.  For example, the USGA has previously maintained a player should play to his Index 20 percent of the time.  The 2012-2015 Edition now implies a player has a much better chance to play to his Index than .20.  It is difficult to believe the HRT would be party to such a ruse. 

Hovde also maintains two or more of the originators of the table agreed with using ranges.  The only surviving members of the HRT who did research on outlier identification are Dean Knuth and Frank Engel.  Knuth has implied he had nothing to do with the change.[7]  Perhaps Engel supported the change, but that would still be far from the unanimous approval Hovde alleges.  It is more likely Hovde tried to use the imprimatur of the HRT to add credence to his argument.

The final piece of evidence showing Hovde’s defense was disingenuous came with the publication of the USGA Handicap System 2016-2017.  The table in Appendix E now looks like that shown in Table 3 below.[8]  Table 3 shows ranges have disappeared and the left column has reverted to integers.  If there were major benefits to be gained by using ranges, why have they disappeared? 

Table 3
Score Frequency and Probability Table 2016-2017 (Abbreviated)


Net Diff.
Handicap Index Ranges
<  0.0
0.0- 4.9
5.0-9.9
10.0-14.9
15-19.9
20.0-24.9
25.0-29.9
>29.9
0
4.8
4.3
4.3
4.7
5.2
6.2
7.1
6.8
-1
8.8
7.6
7.2
7.6
8.3
9.7
11
9.8
-2
19
15
13
13
14
16
17
15

In early 2012, the USGA must have realized Appendix E was in error.  To make a correction, however, would mean running a revised Appendix E by the Handicap Procedure Committee and admitting to a mistake.  The better option, and the one chosen, would be to bury the change in the 2016-2017 Edition without explanation and hope no one would notice.  And so it goes…





[1] “USGA, The R&A Issue Statement Addressing Tiger Woods Ruling at the 2013 Masters Tournament,” USGA, Far Hills, N.J., May 1, 2013. 
[2] For a full discussion of this ruling see “Bureaucracy, Augusta National, and Tiger Woods,” www.ongolfhandicps.com, April 8, 2013.
[3] The USGA Handicap System, 2006-2007, USGA, Par Hills, NJ, p. 126.
[4] The USGA Handicap System, 2012-2015, USGA, Far Hills, NJ, p. 117.  There is some evidence the column headings were once Handicap Ranges and were switched to Index Ranges to be consistent with Slope System nomenclature. See “The Reliability and Accuracy of USGA Handicap Research,” www.ongolfhandicaps.com, March 6, 2012.  The USGA has not made any study supporting Appendix E available to the public, so its validity remains in question.
[5] Dougharty, Laurence, e-mail to Scott Hovde of the SSGA, February 1, 2012.
[6] Hovde, Scott, e-mail to author, February 9, 2012.
[7] Knuth, Dean, e-mail to author, February 13, 2012.
[8] The USGA will not release the study behind the revised Appendix.  Even without seeing the study, however, some problems with its results are evident-- see “The USGA’s Appendix E: Problematic at Best,” www.ongolfhandicaps.com, forthcoming.

Thursday, August 13, 2015

Revising Decision 6-2/1 of the Rules of Golf

The problem with Rule 6-2/1 of the Rules of Golf has been discussed previously (see The Case for Eliminating Decision 3-5/2 for the USGA Handicap System, 4/16/2015).  It is brought up again to illustrate the difficulty when two organizations (USGA and the R&A) try to write rules governing different handicap systems.  To refresh, here is the decision:  

Meaning of "Handicap"
Q. Under a handicapping system where the player has to adjust his handicap in accordance with the rating for the course he is playing, a player's handicap before adjustment is 4.8. After applying the appropriate adjustment for the course and the tees to be used for that competition, the player's handicap is 6. Which is his "handicap" for the purposes of Rule 6-2?
A. 6.  In a stroke-play competition the player must ensure that the handicap for the course that he is to play and the tees to be used is recorded on his score card when it is returned to the Committee.
The Decision refers to a player with a handicap of 4.8. A handicap expressed to the first decimal does not exist in the USGA Handicap System.  I suspect the Rules Brahmans were trying to say a player was responsible for recording his Course Handicap and not his Handicap Index.   “Index,” however, is specific to the USGA Handicap System.   They needed a more generic term, but made of mess of things by citing a handicap that does not exist in any of the major handicap systems.  Australia has a GA Handicap that is expressed in decimals which is the equivalent of a USGA Index.  This Decision, however, predates the GA Handicap.  The Council of National Golf Unions (CONGU) has an Exact Handicap also expressed in decimals. The CONGU Handicap System is excluded from this Decision since CONGU Playing Handicaps are not adjusted for the rating of the course being played.  Decisions are supposed to clarify the Rules of Golf.  This Decision fails that test.

It should have been sufficient to state in rule 6-2 a player is responsible for recording his Course Handicap. The anomaly of a 4.8 handicap should have been detected and corrected long ago.  A failure of regulatory bodies is to dwell on new regulations (e.g., anchor putting) rather than reviewing existing regulations for their efficacy.  Though the USGA has been made aware of this problem, look for Decision 6-2/1 to live on.   



Monday, June 8, 2015

A Global Handicap System: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come

A column by John Paul Newport (“The Handicap May Finally Go Global,” The Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2015) describes the USGA’s effort to establish a uniform handicap system.  Newport dutifully transcribed everything John Bodenhamer of the USGA told him, but a strong case was never made for implementing a global system.[1]  

Combining a number of systems into one can sometimes make sense.  Having a common currency seems efficient unless one of the countries is Greece.  Having a standard railway track gauge would have benefits unless your neighbor is Germany.  Having one ruling body for a sport would be efficient unless that ruling body is FIFA.  These examples demonstrate standardization is not always a good thing.  It creates monopoly power which can lead to less independence and higher costs for participating members. 

Any global handicap system should meet three requirements to be cost/effective.  First, there should be important benefits attributable to combining handicap systems.   Second, the global system should be so much better it warrants the disruption and suppression of regional systems.  Third, cost savings should benefit the participating parties.  Before examining whether a proposed system meets these requirements, we first hypothesize what a global handicap system will likely look like.

What Would a Global Handicap System Look Like?

It seems clear the USGA will be advocating for its handicap system to become the world standard.  Newport calls it by far the “most sophisticated” in the world.   It is not.  The USGA’s Course and Slope Rating models are flawed and have never been empirically verified.   Nevertheless, the USGA is heavily invested in its handicap system and is unlikely to accept major modifications in the interest of global uniformity. 

The USGA can also argue its system is already used in most parts of the world.  To ensure the global system does not have a Made in America stamp, Bodenhamer only suggests incorporating a Daily Course Rating (DCR) which currently exists in both the Australian and CONGU handicap systems.[2]

Another reason for believing the global system will closely resemble the USGA’s system is monetary.  The two major handicapping systems (USGA and CONGU) are different and incompatible.   In creating a global system, one of the systems will have to go.  The USGA’s system is designed to make handicaps available to as wide a population as possible.  Any organization can become a USGA licensee and sell handicaps if it meets minimal requirements.  Some of these organizations do not hold tournaments on a regular basis, if at all.  The CONGU handicap system bases a player’s handicap only on tournament scores.  Once a player has established an “exact handicap,” his handicap will increase, decrease, or remain the same based on his score in each tournament.  

It seems doubtful the USGA could ever accept a system similar to the CONGU System.   The casual player would have no reason to maintain a handicap if it was based on tournaments in which he rarely played.   If a CONGU-like system was adopted, it would result in a large decrease in handicap sales.  Such a drop would be catastrophic to golf associations who depend on the profit from selling handicaps to subsidize their other operations.[3] 

For the reasons of “pride of authorship,” widespread use, and monetary considerations, the USGA could only accept a global system that closely resembles its current system.  Without the USGA there is no global system.  Therefore, it is assumed a slightly modified USGA handicap system becomes the global handicap system.  Next, the global system is examined to see if it passes the three tests for a cost/effective system listed above.

Are There Important Benefits to the Global Handicap System?

Newport relates the following story to demonstrate the benefit of a global handicap system:

Say you meet a 12-handicap golfer from Australia on the first tee at St. Andrews in Scotland.  If your U.S handicap index also happens to be a 12, you might suggest a friendly money game, with no strokes given.  Bad move.

The bet is not a “bad move” as Newport argues, but it is an ungracious move.[4]  I have been paired with hundreds of strangers all around the world and have never asked or been asked to play a match.  It would reinforce the image of the ugly American if I immediately requested my foreign playing partner to pony up for a $5 Nassau.  One of the great benefits of golf is meeting people from all walks of life on the first tee.   I have always assumed my new partners are there to enjoy the golf and consider the course, especially St. Andrews, to be the competition.  Are there a sufficient number of encounters between players of different countries to justify the myriad of costs associated with a global handicap system?  It appears unlikely.[5]  

Is the Global Handicap System Really Better?

Adding a DCR to the USGA handicap system has the illusion, if not the substance, of increased accuracy.    It will cost an unknown amount to implement a DCR, but the benefits may be ethereal.  Here are some reasons why:
·         A round played under adverse conditions will probably not be among a player’s best ten (best eight in Australia) scores used in calculating a player’s index.   In which case, it would have only a marginal effect on a player’s index (e.g., it could push out a low score from the last 20 scores).
·         Conditions often change between the morning and afternoon as demonstrated repeatedly on the PGA Tour.  If conditions were benign in the morning but rough in the afternoon, an algorithm using the DCR would estimate the morning players to be better than they really are.
·         Australia has had a DCR for some time.  Golf Australia (Australia’s equivalent of the USGA) has not published any research showing that the DCR has a significant effect on a player’s index.  I suspect Golf Australia does not test the efficacy of the DCR for the same reason the USGA  never tests the efficacy Slope System—neither may like the results.[6]
·         Going to a DCR will introduce even more errors into the beleaguered handicap system.[7]   There will be model errors (i.e., does the estimating model accurately reflect reality?), sampling errors, and conversion errors in making Stableford scores consistent with stroke play scores.   

A USGA style handicap system has much looser controls on the malevolent player.  In the USGA handicap system, a player can play alone, post a score, and not turn in a scorecard.  His non-tournament scores count the same as his tournament scores.[8]  He is also allowed to take a high number on a hole (e.g., a seven on a par 3 for a 10-19 handicap).  Peer review is also non-existent at many affiliate clubs (i.e., clubs without a course) where members may not even have a nodding acquaintance.[9]  If these USGA controls are incorporated into the global system, it would be difficult to argue the new system is more equitable than the present CONGU handicap system.

The true value of many golf statistics (e.g., Course Rating, Slope Rating, and a Player’s Handicap) cannot be measured.  This makes it impossible to determine if a global system actually reduces the estimating error in a player’s Index.    If there were two systems for estimating a player’s weight, for example, the more accurate system could be found by seeing how close each system predicts a player’s true weight.  If a global handicap system estimates a player’s Index at 11.6 while the old system puts him at 11.9, there is no way to determine which system is better since a player’s true index is unknown.  The USGA will argue the global handicap system should give a more accurate estimate since it incorporates more variables, uses complex models, and costs a lot of money.  In truth, the USGA will have no idea if accuracy is improved and if so by how much.    

Are There Cost Savings Benefiting Participating Parties?

The global handicap system does not appear to generate any major cost savings.  If it is administered centrally, having every golf score whizzing around the world in order to have a DCR for every course, is a costly use of the telecommunication spectrum.  If the global handicap system is administered on a country-by-country basis, then there certainly are no economies of scale to be had.  It is even probable costs would increase.  
  
While costs are not going to be lower, they can be shifted.   Bodenhamer makes an economic argument for various associations to adopt the global handicap system when he states the USGA and R&A will jointly bear the costs for maintaining and updating the system.[10]   Newport does not make clear who will benefit from this subsidy.  If regional associations no longer have to pay for handicap services they could be a net beneficiary.  Handicap costs, however, are a relatively small part of the budget of most associations.  Eliminating this cost is a small economic incentive and is unlikely to be a major determinant in deciding between a global handicap system and the status quo.

Summary and Conclusion

A global handicap system appears to have only a small benefit, may not increase the equity of competition, could be costly, and is sure to infuriate many who like their present system (i.e., CONGU).  In essence, there are no strong arguments for a global handicap system.   The movement for a global system does not appear to come from players, but rather from the bureaucracy.  It could be part of the USGA’s continuing quest for hegemony over the world of golf.  The USGA is now the dominant partner in rules and equipment specifications.   A logical next step would be to add handicaps to its portfolio.  If centralizing control of the handicap system is the USGA’s objective, it needs to explain why such a move would be in the best interest of the game.




[1] John Bodenhamer is the Senior Managing Director of Rules, Competition, and Equipment at the USGA.  Note the absence of “handicapping” in his title.  In fact, none of the USGA’s senior leadership team has “handicapping” in their job title. This gives the impression handicapping is not all that important within the bureaucracy of the USGA.
[2] CONGU stands for the Council of National Golf Unions and is the handicap authority in Great Britain and Ireland.
[3] A typical golf association charges around $40 for a membership which includes a USGA handicap.  It probably costs $2 to provide the handicap leaving the association to spend $38 as it sees fit.
[4] Had Newport examined the Australian handicap system, he would have known this was not a “bad move.”  A player’s Golf Australia handicap is the same as an Index in the U.S.  If both players have the same Index, the U.S. player is better than the Australian Player.  There are four reasons for this.  First, Australia uses the best eight scores while the U.S. uses the best ten scores in computing a player’s index.   If the two players had the same scoring record, the Australian’s Index would be lower.  Second, Golf Australia decreases the average of the eight best scores by .93.  The U.S. decreases the average of the ten best scores by .96 (i.e., the Bonus for Excellence).  Again, with the same scoring record, the Australian’s index would be lower.  Third, equitable stroke control is much tougher in Australia.  Australia uses Stableford scoring to compute a player’s index.  That means the highest score an Australian can take is a double bogey.  So if both players took a 7 on a par three, the Australian would post a 5 while the American would (if he was between a 10 and 19 handicap) post a 7.  The Australian then gets the lower index even both players scored the same.  Fourth, Golf Australia computes a Daily Course Rating.  On a tough weather day, the Australian has his handicap differential reduced.  The American does not.
[5] George Peper in his book Two Years at St. Andrews (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2006) documents his travails with the differences in handicap systems between the United States and Scotland.  Nowhere in the book does Peper argue for a global handicap system.  He probably realized he was not in Scotland to win matches, but to enjoy the experience.  He adapted to the Scottish system and flourished.   
[6] See Dougharty, Laurence, “The Selling of the Slope Handicap System: The Big Con?” www.ongolfhandicaps, March 24, 2015.  A small sample of players was used to examine the effect of the Slope Rating on a player’s scoring differential.  The effect was small and statistically insignificant, but that may be due to the small sample size.
[7] The USGA Handicap System contains many self-admitted biases.  There is sampling error in using only 20 scores.  The handicap estimate is also a lagging indicator of a player’s current ability.  There are numerous rounding errors made in the calculation of a player’s index and his subsequent course handicap.  There are errors in the estimates of the Course and Slope Ratings that in turn lead to errors in the estimate of a player’s handicap.  Then there are the errors caused by the dubious character of some players (sandbaggers).
[8] In theory, Sec. 10-3 of the USGA Handicap System reduces a player’s Index for exceptional tournament performance.  In practice, however, this section is ineffective.
[9] See Dougharty, Laurence “The Pacific Amateur Golf Tournament: If You Go,” www.ongolfhandicaps, December 5, 2014.  A player from an affiliate club won the Pacific Amateur two years in a row but never posted the championship round from either year.
[10] There are also legal and economic consequences to a global system that incorporates a DCR.  Under the DCR, a player’s index is influenced not just how he plays, but by how others play.  This means the services of many private companies that provide handicaps services to various golf associations and individuals will be will be forced out of the market.  An example would be MyScorecard which provides handicaps under a USGA license for $14.95 per year.  A player uses the internet to send MyScorecard his scores, and MyScorecard uses the USGA’s formula to calculate the player’s index.  Under the proposed system, MyScorecard could no longer provide an independent handicap service because it would not have access to the scores of other players.  The proposed system must of necessity create a worldwide monopoly that controls scoring data—basically a super GHIN.  The USGA lost a court case when it tried to restrict who could use its handicap formula.  The proposed system is a more subtle form of restricting trade.  Anyone can use the proposed formula, but no one outside of the monopoly will have access to the data to implement the new system.  Therefore, the business model of organizations like MyScorecard would be dead.  How the courts will view this restraint of trade is anyone’s guess.