An article by Kevin O’Connor appearing in Fore Magazine entitled “The Truth Behind
those Tournament Scores” contains a statement that ironically appears to be untrue:[1]
Sometimes golfers impacted express the concern that at the time the
score was posted it did not seem exceptional, but as a player’s normal
calculation increased a score/differential may have become exceptional. This was purposely implemented as part of the
formula, which is all about potential ability.
In other words, players have objected to receiving a reduced
index under Sec. 10-3 even though they did not do well in a tournament.[2] O’Connor argues this reduction was a purpose
of Sec. 10-3. Evidence indicates such reductions were not the result of well
crafted regulation, but rather an unintended consequence. Let’s examine three pieces of evidence:
1. The USGA
entitled Sec. 10-3 “Reduction of USGA Handicap Index Based on Exceptional
Tournament Scores.” It was not entitled
“Using Tournament Scores as a Measure of a Player’s Potential. “ If the USGA wanted to measure a player’s
potential, a sample of two scores is too small to be reliable. A more reasonable approach would have been to
adopt a “cap” where a player’s index is limited to a certain number of strokes
over his low-index of the year. [3]
2. The example in
the Handicap System implies the
tournament scores were “exceptional.” After
all, the purpose of Sec. 10-3 was to impose a penalty on a player who won with
scores that were much lower than expected.
Nowhere in the Handicap System does
it explicitly discuss how tournament scores can become exceptional as a
player’s index increases sometime later.
If the USGA really thought of Sec. 10-3 a measure of a player’s
potential ability, it seems likely it would have mentioned this added benefit
somewhere. More to the point, the USGA
indentified the problem early on. Dean
Knuth wrote in 1994 “The Handicap Research Team….(is) seeking ways to keep from
reducing declining players whose early
year tournaments are much better than their current performance.” [4]
3. Sec. 10-3
creates inequities contrary to the purpose the Handicap System. Let’s take
an example of a player with two T-score differentials of 10.0 made while he was
an 11.0 index. It is likely our player
did not win anything in the two tournaments.
When this player plays a competitor with the exact same scoring record
(though no T-scores), however, he must give strokes. If both players had a 16.0 index, for
example, the non-tournament player would receive four strokes (assuming the
Slope Rating is 113) from the tournament player as shown in the Table below. This is contrary to the purpose the Handicap System which is to “enable
golfers of all levels to compete on a comparatively equal basis.” [5] It seems unlikely the USGA would “purposefully”
create such inequity.
Table
Reduction in Index
Sec.
10-2 Index
|
Sec. 10-3 Reduction
|
Strokes
Given to Non Tournament Player
|
13
|
13.0
|
0
|
14
|
13.0
|
1
|
15
|
12.4
|
2
|
16
|
11.9
|
4
|
17
|
11.5
|
5
|
The Table also reveals another
paradox of Sec. 10-3. If Sec. 10-3 is to
measure a player’s potential, why is that potential dependent upon his Sec.
10-2 index? As shown in the Table, a
player with a 17 index is assigned more potential (i.e., a lower index) than a
player with a 14.0 index. If two players
had the same tournament scores, shouldn't their potential be the same? The initial
Sec. 10-3 is at least consistent by keeping a player’s potential (i.e., reduced
index) independent of his Sec. 10-2 index once the net differential (handicap
index – average of 2 best T-score differentials) threshold of 3.0 is reached. [6]
Based on this evidence, it is likely the USGA didn't
consider the collateral damage to the innocent bystanders described above. The good news is the incidence of such damage
is very small. The bad news is the lack of
casualties stems from Sec. 10-3 being ineffectual in punishing both the guilty
and the innocent. The low apprehension
rate of Sec. 10-3 can be traced to at least three causes:
· Some tournaments use a format where scores
cannot be posted (e.g., Chapman, scrambles).
· Four-ball tournaments allow the unethical player
opportunities to manipulate his score.
· Sec. 10-3 is not applied uniformly. Sec. 10-3 is often ignored at some clubs, and
used too often at others. This makes the
Section both ineffective and inequitable.
The USGA has never published any research on the effectiveness
of Sec. 10-3. When asked recently how
many players receive a reduced index, the USGA replied “We do not keep such
statistics.”[7] Apparently the USGA does not want to know the
effectiveness of this section. Sec. 10-3
lives on since it: 1) gives the illusion of curing the sandbagging problem, 2)
does not generate negative feedback since so few are affected, and 3) relieves
the indolent handicap committee of the responsibility for rooting out the
unethical player. In essence, it is the
perfect bureaucratic solution.
[1]
O’Connor, Kevin The Truth Behind “Those Tournament Scores,” Fore Magazine, Southern California Golf
Association, Winter 2014, p. 66.
O’Connor is Director of Handicap and Membership for the Southern
California golf Association. He
previously serve as Senior Director of Handicapping for the United states Golf
Association.
[2]
Sec. 10-3, “Reduction of Handicap Index Based on Exceptional Tournament Scores,”
USGA Handicap System -2012-2015, pp.
78-83.
[3] Such
a cap is part of the handicap system of Australia—see Golf Australia Handicap
System, 2014.
[4]
Knuth, Dean, et. al., “Outlier
identification procedure for reduction of handicaps,” Science and Golf II, E and F Spon, London, 1994, p. 233.
[5]
Lahman, Eric, “Purpose of the USGA Handicap System,” www.USGA.org, 2009.
[6]
Sec. 10-3, “Reduction of USGA Handicap Index Based on Exceptional Tournament
Scores,” USGA Handicap System, 1994,
pp. 41-43. The player in the example
would play to the lower of his current index or 13.0 (i.e., average of two
T-scores + 3.0).
[7]
E-mail to author from Annie Pollock, USGA, November 20, 2013.
.
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